Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter discusses four arguments in favor of the view that perceptual content possesses a truth - value only relative to a centered world in which an individual and a time are marked, viz. the argument from primitive colors, the argument from the inverted spectrum, the argument from dual looks, and the argument from duplication. It is widely held that discourse involving predicates of personal taste, normative expressions, conditionals, color terms, and future contingents has contents that possess truth - values only relative to epistemic and subjective properties of the speaker or someone who assesses the discourse for truth. While the arguments presented here do not show that perceptual content has a truth - value only relative to someone who assesses the perceptual state for veridicality (though some of them indicate this), they do show that perceptual content has a truth - value only relative to epistemic and subjective properties of the perceiver. Perceptual experience is thus in an important sense similar to discourse involving predicates of personal taste, normative expressions, conditionals, color terms and future contingents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationA Companion to Relativism
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
Pages137-158
Number of pages22
ISBN (Print)9781405190213
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 20 2011
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Truth Value
Discourse
Perceptual Content
Future Contingents
Personal Taste
Color Terms
Perceptual Experience

Keywords

  • Argument from the inverted spectrum
  • Centered worlds and content of perception
  • Chalmers's view, experiences - representing physical color properties
  • First argument for thesis - that content of perception is relativistic, the argument from primitive colors
  • Four main arguments, in favor of the view - that content of perception is relativistic
  • Fourth argument for the thesis - content of perception is relativistic or argument from duplication
  • Phenomenal character, determining a Fregean content - rather than a Russellian or possible-worlds content
  • Relative to a possible world - determining a set of objects instantiating property
  • Relativistic content - in standard semantics
  • The argument from dual looks - third argument for the thesis, content of perception being relativistic

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Brogaard, B. (2011). Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception. In A Companion to Relativism (pp. 137-158). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444392494.ch8

Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception. / Brogaard, Berit.

A Companion to Relativism. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. p. 137-158.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Brogaard, B 2011, Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception. in A Companion to Relativism. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 137-158. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444392494.ch8
Brogaard B. Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception. In A Companion to Relativism. Wiley-Blackwell. 2011. p. 137-158 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444392494.ch8
Brogaard, Berit. / Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception. A Companion to Relativism. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. pp. 137-158
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