Abstract
Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors’ union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 217-230 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Latin American Research Review |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2018 |
Fingerprint
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Bribery cartels : Collusive corruption in Bolivian street markets. / Hummel, Calla.
In: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, 01.01.2018, p. 217-230.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Bribery cartels
T2 - Collusive corruption in Bolivian street markets
AU - Hummel, Calla
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors’ union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society.
AB - Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors’ union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85049679376&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85049679376&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.25222/larr.342
DO - 10.25222/larr.342
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85049679376
VL - 53
SP - 217
EP - 230
JO - Latin American Research Review
JF - Latin American Research Review
SN - 0023-8791
IS - 2
ER -