Breaking the low pay, no pay cycle: the effects of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement programme

Richard Hendra; James Riccio; Richard Dorsett; Philip K. Robins

doi:10.1186/s40173-015-0042-9

Breaking the low pay, no pay cycle: the effects of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement programme

Richard Hendra, James Riccio, Richard Dorsett, Philip K. Robins

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents the final economic results of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme. ERA’s distinctive combination of post-employment advisory support and financial incentives was designed to help low-income individuals who entered work sustain employment and advance in the labour market. ERA targeted three groups. ERA produced short-term earnings gains for two lone parent target groups. However, these effects generally faded after the programme ended, largely because the control group caught up with the ERA group. For the New Deal 25 Plus target group (mostly long term unemployed men), ERA produced modest but sustained increases in employment and earnings. JEL Codes: I38, J18, C93

Original language	English (US)
Article number	14
Journal	IZA Journal of Labor Policy
Volume	4
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1186/s40173-015-0042-9
State	Published - Dec 1 2015

Keywords

Field experiment
Financial incentives
Long term unemployed
Welfare-to-work

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Industrial relations
Economics and Econometrics
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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10.1186/s40173-015-0042-9

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AB - This paper presents the final economic results of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme. ERA’s distinctive combination of post-employment advisory support and financial incentives was designed to help low-income individuals who entered work sustain employment and advance in the labour market. ERA targeted three groups. ERA produced short-term earnings gains for two lone parent target groups. However, these effects generally faded after the programme ended, largely because the control group caught up with the ERA group. For the New Deal 25 Plus target group (mostly long term unemployed men), ERA produced modest but sustained increases in employment and earnings. JEL Codes: I38, J18, C93

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Breaking the low pay, no pay cycle: the effects of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement programme

Abstract

Keywords

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