Balancing in neorealism

Joseph Parent, Sebastian Rosato

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Does neorealism offer a convincing account of great power balancing behavior? Many scholars argue that it does not. This conclusion rests on a misunderstanding of neorealist theory and an erroneous reading of the evidence. Properly specified, neorealism holds that great powers place an overriding emphasis on the need for self-help. This means that they rely relentlessly both on arming and on imitating the successful military practices of their peers to ensure their security. At the same time, they rarely resort to alliances and treat them with skepticism. There is abundant historical evidence to support these claims. Since 1816, great powers have routinely achieved an effective balance in military capabilities with their relevant competitors and promptly copied the major military innovations of the period. Case studies show that these outcomes are the product of states� efforts to ensure security against increasingly capable rivals. Meanwhile, the diplomatic record yields almost no examples of firm peacetime balancing coalitions over the past 200 years. When alliances have formed, great powers have generally doubted the reliability of their allies and of their opponents� allies. Thus neorealism provides a solid foundation for explaining great power balancing behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)51-86
Number of pages36
JournalInternational Security
Volume40
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2015

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neorealism
great power
Military
allies
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evidence
coalition
innovation
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Law

Cite this

Balancing in neorealism. / Parent, Joseph; Rosato, Sebastian.

In: International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, 01.10.2015, p. 51-86.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Parent, J & Rosato, S 2015, 'Balancing in neorealism', International Security, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 51-86. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00216
Parent, Joseph ; Rosato, Sebastian. / Balancing in neorealism. In: International Security. 2015 ; Vol. 40, No. 2. pp. 51-86.
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