Animals That Act for Moral Reasons

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This article argues that some animals are moral subjects in the sense that they can be, and sometimes are, motivated by moral considerations. It argues that there are no empirical or conceptual obstacles to regarding some animals as motivated by moral concerns. To suppose otherwise, the discussion notes, is to fall victim to certain views that invest quasi-magical properties in "meta-cognition"-properties that afford humans a status of a sort possessed by no other beings. It argues that the sentiments of animals can be genuinely moral ones and that there are no compelling reasons to suppose that these animals are not moral subjects that can be morally evaluated- even if they cannot be moral agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780199940134, 9780195371963
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2012

Fingerprint

Moral Reasons
Animals
Metacognition
Moral Agents
Sentiment

Keywords

  • Animal sentiments
  • Humans
  • Meta-cognition
  • Moral agents
  • Moral subjects

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Rowlands, M. (2012). Animals That Act for Moral Reasons. In The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0019

Animals That Act for Moral Reasons. / Rowlands, Mark.

The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Rowlands, M 2012, Animals That Act for Moral Reasons. in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0019
Rowlands M. Animals That Act for Moral Reasons. In The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. 2012 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0019
Rowlands, Mark. / Animals That Act for Moral Reasons. The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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