Abstract
Ernest Sosa has argued that the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge has yet to overcome serious difficulties. The most serious difficulty is that of providing criteria for when a rival alternative to a claim is relevant. Without such criteria, the theory is ad hoc. I argue that most other externalist theories of knowledge, including Sosa’s own, fall victim to this criticism. At the end of the paper I make a suggestion as to why Sosa’s objection might not be as damaging as it at first seems.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 65-82 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Philosophical Papers |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2003 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy