A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation

Margaret M. Byrne; Peter Thompson

doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00065-5

A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation

Margaret M. Byrne, Peter Thompson

Public Health Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

Financial incentives of various kinds have been suggested to alleviate the chronic shortage of transplantable organs in the United States. This paper analyzes the possible consequences of financial incentives on organ supply. We show that under current practice and current law (which are not the same), inducements to donate organs or to register as an organ donor may lead to a decline in the supply of organs. Furthermore, some financial incentives that have been proposed lead to time inconsistent choices. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	69-83
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Health Economics
Volume	20
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00065-5
State	Published - Jan 1 2001

Keywords

Financial incentives
Organ donation
Signaling
Transplants

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00065-5

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