A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation

Margaret M Byrne, Peter Thompson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Financial incentives of various kinds have been suggested to alleviate the chronic shortage of transplantable organs in the United States. This paper analyzes the possible consequences of financial incentives on organ supply. We show that under current practice and current law (which are not the same), inducements to donate organs or to register as an organ donor may lead to a decline in the supply of organs. Furthermore, some financial incentives that have been proposed lead to time inconsistent choices. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)69-83
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2001
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Tissue and Organ Procurement
Motivation
Tissue Donors
Financial incentives
Organ donation

Keywords

  • Financial incentives
  • Organ donation
  • Signaling
  • Transplants

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation. / Byrne, Margaret M; Thompson, Peter.

In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, 01.01.2001, p. 69-83.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Byrne, Margaret M ; Thompson, Peter. / A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation. In: Journal of Health Economics. 2001 ; Vol. 20, No. 1. pp. 69-83.
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