Abstract
Financial incentives of various kinds have been suggested to alleviate the chronic shortage of transplantable organs in the United States. This paper analyzes the possible consequences of financial incentives on organ supply. We show that under current practice and current law (which are not the same), inducements to donate organs or to register as an organ donor may lead to a decline in the supply of organs. Furthermore, some financial incentives that have been proposed lead to time inconsistent choices. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 69-83 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Journal of Health Economics |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2001 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Financial incentives
- Organ donation
- Signaling
- Transplants
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation. / Byrne, Margaret M; Thompson, Peter.
In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, 01.01.2001, p. 69-83.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation
AU - Byrne, Margaret M
AU - Thompson, Peter
PY - 2001/1/1
Y1 - 2001/1/1
N2 - Financial incentives of various kinds have been suggested to alleviate the chronic shortage of transplantable organs in the United States. This paper analyzes the possible consequences of financial incentives on organ supply. We show that under current practice and current law (which are not the same), inducements to donate organs or to register as an organ donor may lead to a decline in the supply of organs. Furthermore, some financial incentives that have been proposed lead to time inconsistent choices. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
AB - Financial incentives of various kinds have been suggested to alleviate the chronic shortage of transplantable organs in the United States. This paper analyzes the possible consequences of financial incentives on organ supply. We show that under current practice and current law (which are not the same), inducements to donate organs or to register as an organ donor may lead to a decline in the supply of organs. Furthermore, some financial incentives that have been proposed lead to time inconsistent choices. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
KW - Financial incentives
KW - Organ donation
KW - Signaling
KW - Transplants
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035216266&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035216266&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00065-5
DO - 10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00065-5
M3 - Article
C2 - 11148872
AN - SCOPUS:0035216266
VL - 20
SP - 69
EP - 83
JO - Journal of Health Economics
JF - Journal of Health Economics
SN - 0167-6296
IS - 1
ER -