A nonreductivist solution to mental causation

Amie Thomasson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Nonreductive physicalism provides an appealing solution to the nature of mental properties. But its success as a theory of mental properties has been called into doubt by claims that it cannot adequately handle the problems of mental causation, as it leads either to epiphenomenalism or to thoroughgoing overdetermination. I argue that these apparent problems for the nonreductivist are based in fundamental confusion about causation and explanation. I distinguish two different types of explanation and two different relations to which they appeal: causation and determination. I argue that these types of explanation do not compete with one another, nor do these relations jointly result in overdetermination. In closing I develop a nonreductivist solution to mental causation which avoids both the hazards of epiphenomenalism and of overdetermination and so demonstrates a way to save nonreductive physicalism from the problems of mental causation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)181-195
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume89
Issue number2-3
StatePublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Overdetermination
Mental Causation
Problem of Mental Causation
Mental Properties
Nonreductive Physicalism
Epiphenomenalism
Causation
Hazard
Confusion
Fundamental

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Thomasson, A. (1998). A nonreductivist solution to mental causation. Philosophical Studies, 89(2-3), 181-195.

A nonreductivist solution to mental causation. / Thomasson, Amie.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 89, No. 2-3, 1998, p. 181-195.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Thomasson, A 1998, 'A nonreductivist solution to mental causation', Philosophical Studies, vol. 89, no. 2-3, pp. 181-195.
Thomasson, Amie. / A nonreductivist solution to mental causation. In: Philosophical Studies. 1998 ; Vol. 89, No. 2-3. pp. 181-195.
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