Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure communication between secondary users (SUs) and their serving base station in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and multiple primary users. We analyze the interactions between the SUs and eavesdroppers using the framework of noncooperative game theory. To solve the formulated game, we propose a novel secure channel selection algorithm that enables the SUs and eavesdroppers to take distributed decisions so as to reach a Nash equilibrium point. We study and analyze several properties of the equilibrium resulting from the proposed algorithm. Simulation results show that the proposed approach yields significant improvements of at least 32.7%, in terms of the average secrecy rate per SU, relative to a classical spectrum sharing scheme. Moreover, the results show that the proposed scheme enables the SUs to reach Nash equilibrium with up to 86.5% less computation than standard learning algorithms.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | IEEE International Conference on Communications |
| Pages | 2095-2099 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 1 2013 |
| Event | 2013 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2013 - Budapest, Hungary Duration: Jun 9 2013 → Jun 13 2013 |
Other
| Other | 2013 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2013 |
|---|---|
| Country | Hungary |
| City | Budapest |
| Period | 6/9/13 → 6/13/13 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Computer Networks and Communications
Cite this
A game-theoretic view on the physical layer security of cognitive radio networks. / Houjeij, Ali; Saad, Walid; Bascar, Tamer.
IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2013. p. 2095-2099 6654835.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - A game-theoretic view on the physical layer security of cognitive radio networks
AU - Houjeij, Ali
AU - Saad, Walid
AU - Bascar, Tamer
PY - 2013/12/1
Y1 - 2013/12/1
N2 - In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure communication between secondary users (SUs) and their serving base station in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and multiple primary users. We analyze the interactions between the SUs and eavesdroppers using the framework of noncooperative game theory. To solve the formulated game, we propose a novel secure channel selection algorithm that enables the SUs and eavesdroppers to take distributed decisions so as to reach a Nash equilibrium point. We study and analyze several properties of the equilibrium resulting from the proposed algorithm. Simulation results show that the proposed approach yields significant improvements of at least 32.7%, in terms of the average secrecy rate per SU, relative to a classical spectrum sharing scheme. Moreover, the results show that the proposed scheme enables the SUs to reach Nash equilibrium with up to 86.5% less computation than standard learning algorithms.
AB - In this paper, we investigate the problem of secure communication between secondary users (SUs) and their serving base station in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and multiple primary users. We analyze the interactions between the SUs and eavesdroppers using the framework of noncooperative game theory. To solve the formulated game, we propose a novel secure channel selection algorithm that enables the SUs and eavesdroppers to take distributed decisions so as to reach a Nash equilibrium point. We study and analyze several properties of the equilibrium resulting from the proposed algorithm. Simulation results show that the proposed approach yields significant improvements of at least 32.7%, in terms of the average secrecy rate per SU, relative to a classical spectrum sharing scheme. Moreover, the results show that the proposed scheme enables the SUs to reach Nash equilibrium with up to 86.5% less computation than standard learning algorithms.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84891365081&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84891365081&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC.2013.6654835
DO - 10.1109/ICC.2013.6654835
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84891365081
SN - 9781467331227
SP - 2095
EP - 2099
BT - IEEE International Conference on Communications
ER -