A game theoretic approach for load-shifting in the smart grid

Murat Erkoc, Eeyad Al-Ahmadi, Nurcin Celik, Walid Saad

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, load-shifting within the context of smart grid demand response is investigated for an electricity market composed of a single energy provider and multiple consumers. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the provider, acting as leader, moves first and offers price discounts across a finite time horizon to motivate consumers to shift their energy consumptions from peak periods. The consumers, acting as followers, respond by deciding if and how they shift their consumption from their nominal demand. In this model, the aim of the energy provider is to maximize its profits, while the consumers aim to minimize their total costs related to both the energy consumption and inconvenience of deviating from the nominal demand. Within this setting, a procedure is proposed to obtain equilibrium outcomes and managerial insights are derived by investigating the impact of various factors, including consumer types and market diversity, on the interactions between the energy provider and its customers. Our results show that price discounts may provide significant leverage for achieving lower peak-To-Average ratios while improving the service provider's profits. Our results demonstrate that when load-shifting is sacrificial for the consumers, equilibrium discounts and server provider profits not only depend on the size of the demand (market depth) but also the composition and the number of consumers (market breadth).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages187-192
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781467382892
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 17 2016
EventIEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015 - Miami, United States
Duration: Nov 1 2015Nov 5 2015

Other

OtherIEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015
CountryUnited States
CityMiami
Period11/1/1511/5/15

Fingerprint

Profitability
Energy utilization
Servers
Chemical analysis
Costs
Power markets

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Erkoc, M., Al-Ahmadi, E., Celik, N., & Saad, W. (2016). A game theoretic approach for load-shifting in the smart grid. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015 (pp. 187-192). [7436298] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2015.7436298

A game theoretic approach for load-shifting in the smart grid. / Erkoc, Murat; Al-Ahmadi, Eeyad; Celik, Nurcin; Saad, Walid.

2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 187-192 7436298.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Erkoc, M, Al-Ahmadi, E, Celik, N & Saad, W 2016, A game theoretic approach for load-shifting in the smart grid. in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015., 7436298, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 187-192, IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015, Miami, United States, 11/1/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2015.7436298
Erkoc M, Al-Ahmadi E, Celik N, Saad W. A game theoretic approach for load-shifting in the smart grid. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2016. p. 187-192. 7436298 https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2015.7436298
Erkoc, Murat ; Al-Ahmadi, Eeyad ; Celik, Nurcin ; Saad, Walid. / A game theoretic approach for load-shifting in the smart grid. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. pp. 187-192
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