A coalition formation game in partition form for peer-to-peer file sharing networks

Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Başar, Merouane Debbah, Are Hjørungnes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In current peer-to-peer file sharing networks, a large number of peers with heterogeneous connections simultaneously seek to download resources, e.g., files or file fragments, from a common seed at the time these resources become available, which incurs high download delays on the different peers. Unlike existing literature which mainly focused on cooperative strategies for data exchange between different peers after all the peers have already acquired their resources, in this paper, we study the cooperation possibilities among a number of peers seeking to download, concurrently, a number of resources at the time the availability of the resources is initially announced at a common seed. We model the problem as a coalitional game in partition form and we propose an algorithm for coalition formation among the peers. The proposed algorithm enables the peers to take autonomous decisions to join or leave a coalition while minimizing their average download delay. We show that, by using the proposed algorithm, a Nash-stable partition composed of coalitions of peers is formed. Within every coalition, the peers distribute their download requests between the seed and the cooperating partners in a way to minimize the total average delay incurred on the coalition. Analytically, we study the 2-peer scenario and derive the optimal download request distribution policies. Simulation results show that, using the proposed coalition formation game, the peers can improve their average download delay per peer of up to 99.6% compared to the non-cooperative approach for the case with N = 15 peers.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2010
Event53rd IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2010 - Miami, FL, United States
Duration: Dec 6 2010Dec 10 2010

Other

Other53rd IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2010
CountryUnited States
CityMiami, FL
Period12/6/1012/10/10

Fingerprint

Seed
Electronic data interchange
Availability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Saad, W., Han, Z., Başar, T., Debbah, M., & Hjørungnes, A. (2010). A coalition formation game in partition form for peer-to-peer file sharing networks. In GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference [5683136] https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2010.5683136

A coalition formation game in partition form for peer-to-peer file sharing networks. / Saad, Walid; Han, Zhu; Başar, Tamer; Debbah, Merouane; Hjørungnes, Are.

GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. 2010. 5683136.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Saad, W, Han, Z, Başar, T, Debbah, M & Hjørungnes, A 2010, A coalition formation game in partition form for peer-to-peer file sharing networks. in GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference., 5683136, 53rd IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2010, Miami, FL, United States, 12/6/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2010.5683136
Saad W, Han Z, Başar T, Debbah M, Hjørungnes A. A coalition formation game in partition form for peer-to-peer file sharing networks. In GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. 2010. 5683136 https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2010.5683136
Saad, Walid ; Han, Zhu ; Başar, Tamer ; Debbah, Merouane ; Hjørungnes, Are. / A coalition formation game in partition form for peer-to-peer file sharing networks. GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. 2010.
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